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1. Introduction 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an important evidence collection tool for network 
forensics analysis. An IDS operates by inspecting both inbound and outbound network 
activity and identifying suspicious patterns that may be indicative of a network attack.  
For each suspicious event, IDS software typically records information similar to statistics 
logged by firewalls and routers (e.g., date and time, source and destination IP addresses, 
protocol, and basic protocol characteristics), as well as application-specific information (e.g., 
username, filename, command, and status code).  IDS software also records information that 
indicates the possible intent of the activity [Gra05]. 
IDS data is often the starting point for examining suspicious activity.  Not only do IDSs 
typically attempt to identify malicious network traffic at all transmission control 
protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) layers, they also can log many data fields (including 
raw packets) that can be useful in validating events and correlating them with other data 
sources [Ken06]. 
IDSs are classified into two categories—anomaly detection and misuse (knowledge-based) 
detection.  Anomaly detection systems require the building of profiles for the traffic that 
commonly traverses a given network.  This profile defines an established baseline for the 
communication and data exchange that is normally seen over a period of time.  These 
systems have several drawbacks: the IDS alerts are not well adapted for forensics 
investigation (i.e., sometimes vague), they are complicated (i.e., cannot be communicated 
easily to nontechnical people), and have a high false negative rate.  
In contrast, misuse detection methods, also known as signature-based detection, look for 
intrusive activity that matches specific signatures. These signatures are based on a set of 
rules that match typical patterns and exploits used by attackers to gain access to a network 
[Fer05]. 
The disadvantage with misuse detection systems is that without a signature, a new attack 
method will not be detected until a signature can be generated and incorporated. 
VoIP has had a strong effect on tactical networks by allowing human voice and video to 
travel over existing packet data networks with traditional data packets.  Among the several 
issues that need to be addressed when deploying this technology, security is perhaps the 
most critical. General security mechanisms, such as firewalls and Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS), cannot detect or prevent all attacks. Current techniques to detect and counter 
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attacks against the converged infrastructure are not sufficient; in particular, they are 
deficient with respect to real-time network intrusion detection, especially where very high 
dimensional data are involved, because of computational costs.  In addition, they are unable 
to stop/detect unknown, internal attacks, and attacks that come in the body of the messages 
(e.g., steganophony attacks [Pel09]).  It is indispensable to analyze how an attack happened 
in order to counter it in the future. 
In order to effectively counter attacks against the converged network, a systematic approach 
to network forensic collection and analysis of data is necessary.  In conducting network 
forensics investigations in a VoIP environment, the collection of voice packets in real time 
and the use of automatic mechanisms are fundamental.  In this chapter we will study how 
attacks against the converged network can be automatically detected in order to create a 
more secure VoIP system.  Our primary focus is on attacks that target media and signaling 
protocol vulnerabilities. 
To effectively study new approaches for intrusion detection in VoIP, this chapter starts by 
analyzing the attacks against the VoIP infrastructure from a hybrid architecture perspective, 
which will give a clear set of use cases to which we can relate these attacks. Then, network 
forensic challenges on converged networks are analyzed based on the Digital Forensics 
Research Workshop framework and on the forensic patterns approach.  Further, an analysis 
of the protocol-based intrusion detection method is presented. Then, statistical methods for 
intrusion detection, such as stream entropy estimation and dimensionality reduction, are 
discussed.  Finally, the converged experimentation testbed used for prototype tools and 
commercial software testing is introduced.  This chapter ends with some conclusions and 
ideas for future work.  
2. Attacks against the VoIP network 
As VoIP operates on a converged (voice, data, and video) network, voice and video packets 
are subject to the same threats than those associated with data networks. In this type of 
environment not only is it difficult to block network attackers but also in many cases, 
examiners are unable to find them out [Fer07].  Likewise, all the vulnerabilities that exist in a 
VoIP wired network apply to VoIPoW technologies plus the new risks introduced by 
weaknesses in wireless protocols.  
Figure 1 shows a Use Case diagram for a simplified VoIP system with typical use cases and 
internal and external roles. For example, the subscriber role can be classified as internal or 
remote, and also according to the type of device used. In addition to these roles, the use case 
diagram can be used to systematically analyze the different types of attacks against the VoIP 
network, following the approach in [Fer06].   
Based on the Use Case Diagram of Figure 1, we can identify potential internal and external 
attackers (hackers). Internal attackers could be a subscriber with a malicious behavior. 
Therefore, this Use Case Diagram will help us to determine the possible attacks against the 
VoIP infrastructure.  
Most of the possible attacks against the VoIP infrastructure will be listed systematically. 
Although completeness cannot be assured, we are confident that at least all important 
possible attacks were considered. This research does not guarantee to provide a complete 
list of every possible threat in VoIP. The threats that we assume are based on the knowledge 
of the VoIP application, and from the study of similar systems. 
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Fig. 1. Use case diagram for a VoIP system 
It should be noted that only attacks against the VoIP system are considered. Attacks to 
systems that collaborate with this system are beyond our control (e.g. attacks against radio 
networks). Additional security issues relevant to telecom, physical networks, and  switches 
are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Based on the Use Case Diagram of Figure 1, we can determine the possible attacks against 
the VoIP infrastructure and classified as: Registration Attacks, Attacks when 
Making/Receiving a voice call and attacks against Audit.    
2.1 Attacks when making/receiving a VoIP Call 
Many of the already well-known security vulnerabilities in data networks can have an 
adverse impact on voice communications and need to be protected against [Pog03]. The 
attacks when making/receiving a voice call can be classified as follows: 
Theft of service is the ability of a malicious user to place fraudulent calls. In this case the 
attacker simply wants to use a service without paying for it, so this attack is against the 
service provider.  
Masquerading, occurs when a hacker is able to trick a remote user into believing he is talking 
to his intended recipient when in fact he is really talking to the hacker. Such an attack 
typically occurs with the hacker assuming the identity of someone who is not well-known to 
the target. A masquerade attack usually includes one of the other forms of active attacks 
[Sta02].  
IP Spoofing, occurs when a hacker inside or outside a network impersonates a trusted 
computer.  
Call Interception is the unauthorized monitoring of voice packets or RTCP transmissions. 
Hackers could capture the packets and decode their voice packet payload as they traverse a 
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large network. This kind of attack is the equivalent of wiretapping in a circuit-switched 
telephone system.  
Repudiation attacks can take place when two parties talk over the phone and later on one 
party denies that the conversation occurred.  
Call Hijacking or Redirect attacks could replace a voice mail address with a hacker-specified 
IP address, opening a channel to the hacker [Gre04]. In this way, all calls placed over the 
VoIP network will fail to reach the end user.  
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks prevent legitimate users of a network from accessing the 
features and services provided by the network.  
Signal protocol tampering occurs when a malicious user can monitor and capture the packets 
that set up the call. By doing so, that user could manipulate fields in the data stream and 
make VoIP calls without using a VoIP phone [Pog03]. The malicious user could also make 
an expensive call, and mislead the IP-PBX into believing that it was originated from another 
user.  
Attacks against Softphones occur because as they reside in the data VLAN, they require open 
access to the voice VLAN in order to access call control, place calls to IP phones, and leave 
voice messages. Therefore, the deployment of Softphones provides a path for attacks against 
the voice VLAN. VoIP systems are capable of handling large volumes of calls using both IP 
phones and Softphones. Unlike traditional phones, which must be hardwired to a specific 
PBX port, IP phones can be plugged into any Ethernet jack and assigned an IP address. 
These features not only represent advantages but also they may make them targets of 
security attacks.  
Note that all these attacks apply also to conference calls and some may apply to the use of 
voice mail.  
2.2 Registration attacks 
Brute Force attacks are simply an attempt to try all possible values when attempting to 
authenticate with a system or crack the crypto key used to create ciphertext [Bre99]. For 
example, an attacker may attempt to brute-force attack a Telnet login, he must first obtain 
the Telnet prompt on a system. When connection is made to the Telnet port, the hacker will 
try every potential word or phrase to come up with a possible password.  
Reflection attacks are specifically aimed at SIP systems. It may happen when using http 
digest authentication (i.e. challenge-response with a shared secret) for both request and 
response. If the same shared secret is used in both directions, an attacker can obtain 
credentials by reflecting a challenge in a response back in request. This attack can be 
eliminated by using different shared secrets in each direction. This kind of attack is not a 
problem when PGP is used for authentication [Mar01]. 
The IP Spoofing attacks described earlier can also be classified as registration attacks. 
2.3 Attacks against Audit (IP-PBX and operating systems) 
Due to their critical role in providing voice service and the complexity of the software 
running on them, IP PBXs are the primary target for attackers. Some of their vulnerabilities 
include:  
• Operating system attack. Exploits a vulnerability in an operating system. An attack that 
makes use of this vulnerability, while perhaps not directed toward a VoIP system, can 
nevertheless create issues.  
www.intechopen.com
Developing New Approaches for Intrusion Detection in Converged Networks   
 
325 
• Support software attack. Exploits a vulnerability in a key supporting software system, 
such as a database or web server. An example is the SQL Slammer worm, which 
exploited a vulnerability in the database used on a specific IP PBX.  
• Protocol attack. Exploits a vulnerability in a protocol implementation, such as SIP or 
H.323. An example is the vulnerability in the H.323 implementation in Microsoft's ISA 
Server.  
• Application attack. Exploits a vulnerability in the underlying voice application, which is 
not filtered by the protocol implementation.  
• Application manipulation. Exploits a weakness in security, such as weak authentication or 
poor configuration, to allow abuse of the voice service. For example, registration 
hijacking or toll fraud.  
• Unauthorized access. Occurs when an attacker obtains administrative access to the IP 
PBX.  
• Denial of Service. Either an implementation flaw that results in loss of function or a flood 
of requests that overwhelms the IP PBX [Col04].  
3. Network forensic challenges 
3.1 Reference forensic model  
Several models are used for investigation in forensic science.  We chose the framework from 
the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) because it is comprehensive and more 
oriented to our research approach.  The DFRWS model shows the sequential steps for digital 
forensic analysis [DFRWS01].  These steps are shown in table 1.  
 
Identification Preservation Collection Examination Analysis Presentation 
Event/crime 
detection 
Case 
management 
Preservation Preservation Preservation Documentation 
Resolve 
Signature 
Imaging 
technologies 
Approved 
methods 
Traceability Traceability
Expert 
testimony 
Profile 
detection 
Chain of 
custody 
Approved 
software 
Validation 
techniques 
Statistical Clarification 
Anomalous 
detection 
Time 
synchronization
Approved 
hardware 
Filtering 
techniques 
Protocols 
Mission impact 
statement 
Complaints — 
Legal 
authority 
Pattern 
matching 
Data mining
Recommended 
countermeasure 
System 
monitoring 
— 
Lossless 
compression
Hidden data 
discovery 
Timeline 
Statistical 
interpretation 
Audit analysis — Sampling 
Hidden data 
extraction 
Link — 
— — 
Data 
reduction 
— Spatial — 
— — 
Recovery 
techniques 
— — — 
Table 1. DFRWS digital investigative framework ([DFRWS01]) 
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The preservation phase involves acquiring, seizing, and securing the digital evidence; 
making forensic images of the evidence; and establishing the chain of custody.  The middle 
phases of the forensic process (i.e., the collection, examination, and analysis of the evidence) 
provide network investigators with a structured method to collect more and better evidence 
and to reduce the analysis time in VoIP networks.  
The presentation phase involves the legal aspects of the forensic investigation—presenting 
the findings in court and corporate investigative units by applying laws and policies to the 
expert testimony and securing the admissibility of the evidence and analysis.  This phase is 
outside of the scope of this research, but it must be considered in order to create a 
comprehensive model. 
We concentrate on the initial phase of the forensic process, the identification of potential 
digital evidence (i.e., where the evidence might be found), which is flagged by IDS and, in 
some sense, by the attack patterns. 
3.2 VoIP Evidence Collector 
The VoIP Evidence Collector pattern [Pel10] defines a structure and process to collect attack 
packets on the basis of adaptively setting filtering rules for real-time collection. The collected 
forensic data is sent to a network forensics analyzer for further analysis. This data is used to 
discover and reconstruct attacking behaviors.  
3.2.1 Context 
We are considering a VoIP environment, in which the monitored network should not be 
aware of the collection process. We assume that evidence is being preserved securely. We 
also assume a high-speed network with an authentication mechanism and secure transport 
channel between forensic components. 
3.2.2 Problem 
How to efficiently collect digital attack evidence in real-time from a variety of VoIP 
components and networks?  
The solution to this problem is affected by the following forces: 
• General security mechanisms, such as firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), 
cannot detect or prevent all attacks. They are unable to stop/detect unknown attacks, 
internal attacks, and attacks that come in the body of the messages (at a higher level). 
We need to analyze how an attack happened so we can try to stop it in the future, but 
we first need to collect the attack information.  
• A real-time application, like VoIP, requires an automated collection of forensic data in 
order to provide data reduction and correlation. Current techniques dealing with 
evidence collection in converged networks are based on post-mortem (dead forensic) 
analysis. A potential source of valuable evidence (instant evidence) may be lost when 
using these types of forensics approaches.  
• Even though there are a number of best practices in forensic science, there are no 
universal processes used to collect or analyze digital information. We need some 
systematic structure. 
• The amount of effort required to collect information from different data sources is 
considerable. In a VoIP environment we need automated methods to filter huge 
volumes of collected data and extract and identify data of particular interest. 
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• The large amount of redundancy in raw alerts makes it difficult to analyze the 
underlying attacks efficiently [Wan05] 
• A forensic investigator needs forensic methods with shorter response times because the 
large volume of irrelevant information and increasingly complex attack strategies make 
manual analysis impossible in a timely manner [Wan05].   
3.2.3 Solution 
Collect details about the attacker’s activities against VoIP components (e.g., gatekeeper) and 
the voice packets on the VoIP network and send them to a forensic server. A forensic server 
is a mechanism that combines, analyzes, and stores the collected evidence data in its 
database for real-time response. 
A common way of collecting data is to use sensors with examination capabilities for evidence 
collection. In VoIP forensic investigations, these devices will be deployed in the converged 
environment, thus reducing human intervention. These hardware devices are attached in front 
of the target servers (e.g., gatekeeper) or sensitive VoIP components, in order to capture all 
voice packets entering or leaving the system. These sensors are also used by the Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) to monitor the VoIP network. Examiners can also use packet sniffers 
and Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFAT) to capture and decode VoIP network traffic.  
When the IDS detects any attempt to illegally use the gatekeeper or a known attack against 
VoIP components, it gives alarms to the forensic server, which in turn makes the evidence 
collector start collecting forensic data.  
The evidence collector then collects and combines the forensic information from several 
information sources in the network under investigation. It will also filter out certain types of 
evidence to reduce redundancy. 
3.2.4 Structure 
Figure 2 shows a UML class diagram describing how a VoIP evidence collector [Pel10] and 
an IDS system integrate.  The evidence collector is attached to hosts or network components 
(e.g. call server) at the node where we need to collect evidence in a VoIP network.  Forensic 
data is collected using embedded sensors attached to key VoIP components or Network 
Forensic Analysis Tools (NFAT). VoIP components that are monitored can provide forensics 
information once an attack occurs. The Evidence Collector is designed to extract forensic 
data and securely transport it (i.e., hash and encrypt) to a forensic server using a VoIP 
secure channel [Fer07]. The forensic server combines the logs collected from the target 
servers and the VoIP network and stores them in its database to allow queries via command 
user interfaces. The network forensics server also controls the Evidence Collectors. 
The evidence data collected from VoIP key components includes the IDS log files, system 
log files, and other forensic files. Other sensitive files may include the system configuration 
files and temp files. When attached to a terminal device, the Evidence Collector captures the 
network traffic to record the whole procedure of the intrusion and can be used to 
reconstruct the intrusion behavior [Ren05]. The evidence collector is also able to filter out 
certain types of evidence to reduce redundancy. 
3.2.5 Implementation 
After collecting the desired forensic data, the evidence collectors will send two types of data 
to the network forensics server, depending on the function performed. If the sensor is 
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attached to a key VoIP component, it will collect logging system and audit data; otherwise 
(i.e., attached to a terminal device) it will act as packet sniffers do (with the Network 
Interface Card (NIC) set to promiscuous mode) or  NFAT tools extracting raw network 
traffic data (e.g., entire frames, including the payloads, are captured with tcpdump). These 
data are used to discover and reconstruct attacking behaviors.  
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*
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*
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*
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Fig. 2. Evidence Collector Class Diagram 
As mentioned before, after each attack against the VoIP network, the forensic data collected 
from key components and attacking sources may include logging data. The following data 
may also be useful to discriminate calls and call types: 
• Terminal device information 
• Numbers called 
• Source and destination IP addresses 
• IP geographical localization 
• Incoming calls 
• Start/end times and duration 
• Voice mail access numbers 
• Call forwarding numbers 
• Incoming/outgoing messages 
• Access codes for voice mail systems 
• Contact lists 
• VoIP data 
• Protocol type 
• Configuration data 
• Raw packets  
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• Inter-arrival times 
• Variance of inter-arrival times 
• Payload size 
• Port numbers 
• Codecs 
In order to maintain efficiency when capturing network traffic, we select the data to save, 
such as source and destination addresses and ports, and protocol type. The evidence 
collector can then extract all or selective voice packets (i.e., incoming or outgoing) over the 
VoIP network by applying a filter. The database on the forensics server will store the data 
sent by evidence collectors in order to perform the corresponding forensics analysis. We can 
use network segmentation techniques [Fer07] to monitor the voice VLAN traffic 
independently from data VLAN traffic although the two share the same converged network.  
3.2.6 Dynamics 
The sequence diagram of Figure 3 shows the sequence of steps necessary to perform 
evidence collection in VoIP. In this scenario, as soon as an attack is detected against the 
gatekeeper by the IDS, the evidence collector starts capturing all activities of the possible 
attackers. The evidence collector will then send the collected data to the forensic server 
using a secure VoIP channel. Additionally, the collected forensic data is filtered and stored 
in the system database.   
 
:EvidenceCollector
<<actor>>
anAttacker: :IDS :ForensicServer:Gatekeeper
Figure  3  Sequence diagram for evidence collection in VoIP 
attack() detect()
collect()
X
senddata()
monitor()
transmit()
sendalert()
sendcommand()
filter()
transmit()
 
Fig. 3. Evidence Collector Sequence Diagram 
3.2.7 Consequences 
The advantages of this pattern include: 
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• The use of automated forensic tools as prescribed by this pattern allows effective real-
time collection of forensic information which will reduce the investigation time in VoIP 
incidents. 
• Significant logging information can be collected using this approach. 
• The approach should be helpful to network investigators in identifying and 
understanding the mechanisms needed to collect real-time evidence in converged 
systems, because it provides a systematic way to collect the required information. 
• The VoIP Evidence Collector pattern will also enable the rapid development and 
documentation of methods for preventing future attacks against VoIP networks. 
• It is possible to investigate alleged voice calls using the evidence collector since voice 
travels in packets over the data network. 
• For efficiency, the evidence collector can be set up for capturing selectively network 
packet streams over particular servers such as call, database, and web servers. The 
network forensics server can control the filter rules on the collector. 
• On the other hand, based on the source/destination information, the evidence collector 
can filter the packets of a particular phone conversation. 
• When encryption is present, the evidence collector can capture the headers and contents 
of packets separately. 
The disadvantages of this approach are the limited scalability and relative inefficiency of the 
traffic’s monitoring and recording. In large-volume traffic environments, there is a tradeoff 
between the monitored traffic and the available disk space [Ren05].  
4. Protocol anomaly detection 
Protocol anomaly detection is based on models characterizing proper use of protocols, and 
any behavior that departs from the model will be regarded as intrusive or suspicious. In this 
approach, protocols are well defined, and a normal use model can be created with greater 
accuracy [Aln08]. The creation of a complete profile of normal network traffic that 
implements a particular protocol is the core of this protocol behavior detection method. The 
SIP protocol has specific features that show a sequence of finite states that specify the correct 
behavior in a VoIP network.  
A protocol-based IDS method is able to detect attacks against the converged network using 
information collected from both signaling and media packets. This method focuses on 
detecting misuse of the protocol’s vulnerabilities. In this technique, the system detects 
attacks using information that is collected from the protocol headers.  
4.1 Technical approach 
The protocol-based detection technique defines a structure and demonstrates a process for 
collecting VoIP attack packets on the basis of adaptively setting filtering rules for real-time 
collection. The collected data is sent to a network forensics analyzer for further analysis.  
This data is used to discover and reconstruct attacking behaviors.  
In our approach, we used an IDS infrastructure to collect details about attacker activities 
against VoIP components (e.g., gatekeeper) and the voice packets on the network.  The IDS 
framework is a distributed attack sensing and warning system that uses a series of network-
based collection sensors to acquire relevant forensic information so that intrusion analysts 
can perform effective analysis. This system has been designed to enable high 
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interoperability between tools used for performing network traffic analysis.  It achieves this 
by storing all collected traffic in a central repository and allowing the analysis tools to run 
on the collected data. This eases the burden on the sensors (machines used for collecting 
traffic) by making them simple collection agents.   
In VoIP forensic investigations, these devices will be deployed in a converged environment, 
thus reducing human intervention. These hardware devices will be attached in front of the 
target servers (e.g., call server) or sensitive VoIP components in order to capture all voice 
packets entering or leaving the system. These sensors will also be used by the IDS to 
monitor the VoIP network.  
In order to maintain efficiency when capturing network traffic, we select the data to save, 
such as source and destination addresses and ports, and protocol type. The evidence 
collector can then extract all or selected voice packets (i.e., request or response) over the 
VoIP network by applying a filter. The data collected by the evidence collectors is stored in a 
storage area network cluster and will be used to perform the corresponding forensics 
analysis. We can also use network segmentation techniques [Fer07] to monitor the voice 
virtual local area network (VLAN) traffic independently from data VLAN traffic, although 
the two share the same converged network.  
4.2 Structure 
Figure 4 shows the UML class diagram of the specification-based IDS approach. This diagram 
generalizes the intrusion detection process in a VoIP call and shows the caller and callee 
roles. The model shows how it becomes possible to intercept an access request for a VoIP 
service. The IDS system uses an attack detector to match the sequence of message requests to 
the profiles in the user profile set and decides whether the request is an intrusion or not. If an 
attack is detected, some countermeasures that guarantee to maintain the confidentiality, 
authenticity, integrity and nonrepudiation of the entire VoIP infrastructure are performed.  
4.3 Dynamics 
The sequence diagram in figure 5 shows the necessary steps for profile matching when an 
attack access request has been made using VoIP technology. When the IDS detects any 
attempt to use the VoIP service without authorization or a known attack against VoIP 
components, it gives alarms to the system, which in turn blocks the call request through a 
firewall. 
5. Dimensionality reduction and statistical methods for intrusion detection  
Dimensionality reduction methods allow detection and estimation in a manifold of smaller 
dimension than the data stream.  This improves the speed of detection and greatly reduces 
the complexity of the algorithms without compromising performance.  
Dimensionality reduction methods have been applied in various domains, such as face 
recognition and information retrieval systems, to drastically reduce computational costs of 
processing high-dimensional data via the generation of a low-dimensional feature space that 
preserves relevant aspects of the data.  Dimensionality reduction-based alternative methods 
use statistical signal processing methods in VoIP networks. 
Our method for dimensionality reduction is based on linear random projections. Based on 
the isometry properties of random matrices and the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma, it can be  
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Fig. 4. Class diagram for a specification-based IDS 
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Fig. 5. Sequence diagram for detecting VoIP attacks 
www.intechopen.com
Developing New Approaches for Intrusion Detection in Converged Networks   
 
333 
demonstrated that dimensionality reduction by random projections preserves the local 
topology of sparse signal spaces [Don06].  Moreover, if prior information about the normal 
signal space is known, subspace random projections can be used to further improve the 
accuracy of detection and separation of the different classes of anomalies [Par09, Wan10].  
The incorporation of readily used techniques like Self Organizing Maps and Support Vector 
machines over projected data samples showing very good results over randomly projected 
data [Arr06, Cal09] are evaluated as well.  
The main goal is to develop algorithms to detect and classify anomalies using compressed 
versions of the original traffic data and possibly learn the different classes of anomalies from 
live traffic.  We expect that this approach will improve the speed of detection and greatly 
reduce the complexity of the algorithms without compromising performance. 
5.1 Technical approach 
Dimensionality reduction and statistical methods are used to identify threats in VoIP 
networks.  The proposed intrusion detection system approach provides real-time network 
intrusion detection by projecting the high dimensional dataset to a lower dimensional space 
using the random projection technique, then performing intrusion detection in the lower 
dimensional space using statistical detection methods. 
To that end, processing data is separated in two stages. The first stage consists of mapping 
packets to vectors in a Euclidean space and the subsequent dimensionality reduction.  The 
second stage consists of learning different classes of anomalies and classifying incoming 
data. A key assumption for the success of the proposed system is the possibility to isolate 
the anomalies from the underlying normal traffic structure. The algorithms used in this 
approach model the normal traffic data as part of a manifold or subspace. If this assumption 
holds for the kind of traffic involved in VoIP communications,  then the base of the subspace 
or the parameterization of the manifold can be used to isolate and filter the normal traffic 
contributions to the observed traffic prior to compression. 
After performing the mapping, subspace random projections are used to jointly reduce and 
filter the observed vector. The vector corresponding to the payloads and the vector 
corresponding to the headers are analyzed separately, and a decision is made about the 
nature of the block of packets using the information extracted from both vectors. 
5.1.1 Classification through compressive measurements 
If we consider the stream of bits from the RTP, SIP, or RTCP packets as an N-
dimensional vector of great dimension, we can solve the problem of anomaly detection 
from the projections of the data vector in a proper random basis. The idea is to classify all 
the normal patterns in the compressed domain and then detect the presence of anomalies by 
contrasting with the typical set elements. In general many problems of classification or 
detection can be solved directly in the compressed domain as explained in [Dav09]. A 
particular capability that will be sought is that of reconstructing the original packets from 
dimensionally reduced samples if traffic is presumed malicious.  Part of our research will be 
to adapt this method to the framework of stream detection and classification of data 
streams. Detecting intrusions in the projected lower dimension reduces the complexity of 
the underlying algorithms, which makes it more suitable for real time detection.  Moreover, 
lower dimensional data can be stored and transmitted more efficiently than its higher 
dimensional data, thereby saving system resources. 
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Classification algorithm demands repeated computation of similarity between pairs of vectors 
and the computational overhead increases with the increase in the dimensionality of the 
vectors. We consider that dimensionality reduction of these vectors will help in 
classification, reduce the processing time, and improve the efficiency of the IDS.  However, 
the choice of dimensionality reduction method critically depends on preservation of 
similarity for efficient classification. In our approach we use the compress sensing theory, 
which states that with high probability, every K-sparse signal  x ∈ RN can be recovered from 
just M=O(K.log(N/K)) linear measurements y=Φ.x, where Φ represents an M×N 
measurement matrix drawn randomly from an acceptable distribution [Don06]. Therefore, 
to classify input vectors we use machine learning algorithms such as support vector 
machines (SVM) and self- organizing maps (SOM).  
5.1.2  Stream entropy estimation 
A characterization in terms of stream entropy and sequence typicality of the different 
sections of the RTP, SIP, and RTCP flows is performed to identify and classify normal and 
potentially malicious traffic flows. Our approach is to use information theoretic 
measurements of the protocol headers to reveal the presence of higher-than-normal, 
sustained variation indicative of a covert channel. The entropy estimation is carried out 
through sparse sampling of the data stream. By the bounds given in [Lal06] for sparse 
sampling, one can assure that the estimation of the entropy will be within a fixed error 
margin of the actual value obtaining good levels of accuracy and with a reduced number of 
measurements and memory space required.   
Dimensionality reduction methods based on spectral properties of a data matrix are 
attractive for application to entropy detection; spectral dimensionality reduction methods 
include principle components analysis, linear discriminant analysis, and singular value 
decomposition [Ski07]. These methods have strong statistical foundations, and are provably 
optimal for preserving variance of a dataset. Therefore, it is expected that they will likewise 
be optimal for preserving entropy. Application of these methods to entropy computation for 
network intrusion detection is not completely straightforward, because one must either 
choose a static feature subspace in which to compute entropy or continually generate new 
feature subspaces.  
6. Converged experimentation testbed 
The objective of this testbed is to evaluate developed algorithms in a systematic manner, 
and to evaluate the state of the art open source, COTS, and GOTS tools to determine holes 
for focusing future research initiatives. Technically, this task involves the development of 
simulation components for different signaling protocols, audio and video transports, and 
codecs. The testbed supports both the generation of normal (real and simulated) VoIP 
traffic.  
This testbed is also used to verify the performance of the stream entropy-based intrusion 
detection scheme with network attack experiments. The converged testbed supports the 
generation of normal (real and simulated) VoIP traffic to compute the distribution of 
baseline stream under normal conditions. The performance of the IP telephony IDS is 
evaluated with two metrics: detection rate and false-positive alarms.  
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7. Conclusions and future work 
For the purpose of intrusion detection in VoIP, our approach is based on stream entropy 
estimation, second order statistics, and dimensionality reduction. Entropy-based feature 
spaces have been shown to be successful for detecting network anomalies.  Unfortunately, 
entropy detection is computationally expensive; indeed, parallel methods have been 
proposed to allow for more scalable entropy computation. A very scalable alternative to 
distributed entropy computation is computation of entropy in a compressed domain via 
dimensionality reduction.  
We have run the proposed algorithm against both data transmitted and stored in our IDS 
database where the tool was successful at detecting attack packets with very high accuracy.  
Upon integration into IDS infrastructures, we expect this forensic tool will enable a faster 
response and more structured investigations of VoIP-based network attacks. 
The use of dimensionality reduction methods for intrusion detection is a promising 
direction. The exploration of dimensionality reduction and related statistical approaches 
will allow network analysts to better understand more complex aspects of intrusion 
detection in converged environments. These technologies will primarily be targeted toward 
applications and techniques that capitalize on a distributed attack sensing and warning 
system.  
The approach should be helpful to network analysts for identifying and understanding the 
mechanisms needed to efficiently detect attacks in converged systems. When encryption is 
present, the detection tool can capture the headers and contents of packets separately. 
Future work will include the design of a structure and process to analyze the collected VoIP 
forensic data packets. This will allow the detection of attacks against the converged network 
using information collected from VoIP protocol headers. Future work will also include the 
creation of a misuse pattern catalog containing a set of all attack patterns we want to capture.  
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